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“BRING YOUR OWN DEVICE” POLICIES ALSO BRING COMPLICATIONS IN WORKPLACE
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAWSUITS
MORGAN DAVENPORT

INTRODUCTION
Sexual harassment in the workplace became legally actionable in the late 1970s,
when quid pro quo harassment was first held to be “sex discrimination within the meaning
of Title VII.”1 Since the 1970s, the legal doctrine of sexual harassment has continuously
developed, responding in part to rapid technological changes that have helped to reshape
the workplace.2 A newly emerging company policy called “Bring Your Own Device”
(BYOD), where employees use personal devices for work rather than using companysupplied technology (for example, personal cell phones),3 is another such change that will
continue to reshape the workplace. Although BYOD policies exist at the intersection of
several major tensions in workplace sexual harassment, the impact that these policies will
have on sexual harassment claims is unclear.
This Note discusses the legal challenges that arise with BYOD policies in the
workplace in relation to sexual harassment claims and employer liability. Part I gives a brief
background to the legal development of workplace sexual harassment claims. Part II
discusses the general impact of technology on workplace sexual harassment. Part III
discusses the rise of BYOD policies and examines the legal challenges that these policies
pose when traditional sexual harassment law is applied to cases of sexual harassment
involving these policies. Finally, Part IV explores several different options, both in addition
to and instead of traditional sexual harassment law, which could be used for dealing with

1

2
3

Lucetta Pope, Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About Sexual Harassment But Were Too Politically Correct to Ask
(Or, the Use and Abuse of “But For” Analysis in Sexual Harassment Law Under Title VII), 30 SW. U. L. REV. 253, 272
(2001). See infra Part I for a definition of “quid pro quo” and an in-depth discussion of the development of sexualharassment law.
Jeremy Gelms, Comment, High-Tech Harassment: Employer Liability Under Title VII for Employee Social Media
Misconduct, 87 WASH. L. REV. 249, 249 (2012).
Hope A. Comisky & Tracey E. Diamond, The Risks and Rewards of a BYOD Program: Ensuring Corporate Compliance
Without Causing “Bring Your Own Disaster” at Work, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV. 385, 387 (2014).
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sexual harassment claims. Ultimately, this Note recommends that Congress provide federal
statutes that clarify the problems with workplace sexual harassment law, particularly in the
areas identified in this paper: location, electronic employee monitoring, and First
Amendment issues.
Perpetrators of sexual harassment should not be able to exploit loopholes in Title
VII sexual harassment law to get away with sexually harassing those with whom they work.
Yet, with the current state of the law, this may be exactly what would happen. Resolving
those problems through federal statutes, as advised by this Note, would allow courts to deal
with BYOD policies and workplace sexual harassment in a uniform manner that recognizes
the unique characteristics of BYOD devices and still provides remedies to victims. Without
these statutes, the liability of employers for harassment on BYOD devices will remain
unclear, which may leave victims without protection from their employers and without a
remedy from the court.
I.

THE BASICS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it “an unlawful employment practice
for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.”4 The lower federal courts first found sexual harassment
actionable under Title VII during the late 1970s5 under the theory that it was sex
discrimination.6 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the federal
executive agency that enforces prohibitions against job discrimination,7 created rules
prohibiting workplace sexual harassment in 1980.8 Six years later, the Supreme Court found
that sexual harassment in the workplace was a “viable legal claim” protected by Title VII,
in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).9
In Meritor, the Supreme Court recognized two forms of actionable sexual
harassment: quid pro quo and hostile work environment. 10 First, quid pro quo harassment
is “sexual extortion” in which sex acts are proposed in exchange for a “tangible job benefit.”11
4

5
6
7
8
9
10
11

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). For an updated explanation of the current state of Title VII
protections, which have been amended by various subsequent legislative acts, see Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/titlevii.cfm (last visited Oct. 14,
2014).
Glendora C. Hughes, Sexual Harassment: Then and Now, 33 MD. B.J. May-June 2000, at 27, 27 (discussing Williams v.
Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976) and Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.D.C. 1977)).
Anita Bernstein, Law, Culture, and Harassment, 142 PA. L. REV. 1227, 1243 (1994).
Overview, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 14,
2014).
Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1235.
Michele Ann Higgins, Note, Blakey v. Continental Airlines, Inc.: Sexual Harassment in the New Millennium, 23
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 155, 160 (2002).
Id.
Pope, supra note 1, at 257.
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These cases are generally only actionable if there is a tangible harm, rather than “mere
threats of retaliation.”12 Second, hostile work environment sexual harassment exists if an
employee is subjected to “unwelcome verbal or physical sexual behavior that is either
severe or pervasive.”13 Physical sexual conduct is interpreted broadly enough to include
“visual signs and pornography.”14 “Unwelcome” has been interpreted to mean that the
conduct is “neither solicited nor incited” and is viewed as “undesirable or offensive.”15 In a
lawsuit for hostile work environment claims, the plaintiff has the burden of proving sexual
harassment by a preponderance of the evidence.16 Courts either use a reasonableness
standard17 or look at the totality of the circumstances18 when determining whether the
conduct was both sexual and unwelcome.
Even though sexual harassment occurs between individuals, Title VII does not
“create a cause of action against the harasser”;19 instead, plaintiffs seek compensation from
the liable employer.20 In both Ellerth21 and Faragher,22 the Supreme Court held that “an
employer is vicariously liable for a hostile work environment created by a supervisor.” 23 In
relying on this framework, the Court made the distinction between quid pro quo and
hostile environment cases less critical for establishing employer liability, explaining that
while the terms were still helpful in discussing the situation, they “should no longer define
employer responsibility.”24 The reason behind changing the framework was primarily to
prevent plaintiffs from stretching the definition of quid pro quo harassment to cover their
claim so that the employer would automatically have vicarious liability.25 After these
decisions, employers are strictly liable for quid pro quo harassment if there is a “tangible
job detriment,” regardless of whether they knew about the harassment.26 Employers are
also vicariously liable if there is a hostile work environment because of a supervisor.
However, if a co-worker engaged in the harassment, then the employer is only liable if she

12
13
14

Id.
Higgins, supra note 9.
George Noël Lawrence, What Everyone Should Know About Sexual Harassment, but Was Afraid to Ask, 60 TEX. B.J.
1024, 1027 (1997).
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445, 446 (1997).
18 Lawrence, supra note 14, at 1027.
19 Debra D. Burke, Workplace Harassment: A Proposal for a Bright Line Test Consistent with the First Amendment, 21
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 591, 598 (2004).
20 Bernstein, supra note 17, at 492.
21 Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
22 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
23 Gerald L. Miller, What the General Practitioner Needs to Know to Recognize Sexual Harassment Claims, 62 ALA. LAW.
247, 248 (2001).
24 Burke, supra note 19, at 599–600.
25 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753.
26 Jason L. Gunter & Tammie L. Rattray, Recent Developments in Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 72 FLA. B.J.
94 (1998).
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knew or should have known about the harassment and did not take prompt, appropriate
action to stop the harassment.27
The Ellerth and Faragher cases also provided employers with an affirmative defense
if the employer “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior,” and if the employee “unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise.”28 This affirmative defense is not available in supervisor-sexual-harassment
cases where an actual adverse official act was taken; for example, if an employee was fired
or demoted for failing to comply with sexual demands.29 For co-worker harassment, an
employer can defend a claim by showing that she took immediate and appropriate
corrective action.30
The state of sexual-harassment litigation is not without criticism. Noting that sexual
harassment is the only “subcategory of American federal antidiscrimination law” that
requires the victim to prove it was subjectively “distasteful,” some scholars have argued that
sexual-harassment law does not fit under Title VII.31 Similarly, other authors have argued
that the confusion between “sexual traits and sex” in sexual harassment suits “creeps
beyond Title VII’s bounds.”32 Specifically, one scholar argued that the courts conflate sexual
traits (things that occur usually in either males or females), with the actual category of sex
(being either male or female), and so define sex incorrectly during a sexual-harassment
analysis by “equating sexual attraction and discriminatory intent.”33 In other words, she
argues that there is a causation issue with whether someone is being treated differently
because of sexual attraction or because she belongs to a protected group.34
Other scholars have argued that the courts should create a common-law tort of
sexual harassment35 or that sexual harassment should be regulated through the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration.36 Additionally, some argue that the
reasonableness standard, or that of a “rational woman,” should be replaced with a
“respectful person” standard.37 The rationale is that sexual harassment is an act of
27

Id. The authors also note that there may be a rare case where an employee’s harassing actions are within the scope
of employment (for example, if the employer wants fewer women workers and the harassment aids that goal); if that
is the case, the employer is vicariously liable.
28 Miller, supra note 23, at 248.
29 Id.
30 Burke, supra note 19, at 599.
31 Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1250.
32 Pope, supra note 1, at 254.
33 Id. at 255.
34 Id. at 271.
35 Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic Understanding of Workplace Harassment, 88 GEO.
L.J. 1, 61 (1999); Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1249.
36 Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1292.
37 Bernstein, supra note 17, at 450 (“[H]ostile environment complaints should refer to respect; the plaintiff should be
required to prove that the defendant—a man, or a woman, or a business entity—did not conform to the standard of
a respectful person.”).
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“disrespect” and so the second standard more closely aligns with what is actually
occurring.38 It is also a gender-neutral standard, one that focuses on the “conduct of an
actor rather than the reaction of the complainant.”39
Given all of these criticisms, it is clear that sexual-harassment law is not perfect.
These imperfections become clearer when the limits of sexual-harassment law are probed
with a hypothetical case involving a BYOD device. Those imperfections may leave victims
of sexual harassment without a remedy. However, these criticisms also offer potential
solutions to the problems identified in this paper, as discussed in Part IV of this Note.
It is important to recognize that workplace sexual-harassment claims under Title
VII grew out of the 1970s feminist movement, though they have since evolved from those
beginnings.40 Beginning with the inception of the term “sexual harassment,” scholars have
focused on women as the subordinates at work who bear the brunt of this type of
harassment.41 However, newly-emerging literature on sexual-harassment claims recognizes
the variety of ways that sexual harassment can actually occur:
Actionable harassment now includes, for example, a gay supervisor’s demotion of a gay or
straight male employee based on rejected (or accepted) sexual advances, a female
supervisor’s demotion of a male employee for the same reasons, as well as the comparable
demotion by a lesbian female supervisor of a female employee. Similarly, sexual harassment
does or will include sexual advances towards co-workers (or supervisees), or hostile
behavior towards co-workers (or supervisees) who have rejected advances, in all the above
combinations.42

II.

TECHNOLOGY’S IMPACT ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT
The original legal concept of sexual harassment at work arose in a world that did
not yet have some of the technological devices and tools that are integral to a workplace
today: Internet, smart phones, laptops, emails, and text messaging.43 But as workplaces
benefit by incorporating new technologies, sexual harassers in employment are also able to
take advantage of these new technologies.44 Three problems arise when technology is used
to sexually harass someone at work: (1) the harassment does not always take place at work;
(2) employers’ monitoring of their employees’ online activities is controversial; and (3)
38
39
40
41

Id.
Id. at 455.
See Pope, supra note 1, at 259.
Katherine Roush, Let’s Talk About Sex Discrimination: The Tenth Circuit’s Decision in Dick v. Phone Directories Co.,
83 DENV. U.L. REV. 719, 721–22 (2006).
42 Pope, supra note 1, at 262. This Note focuses on victims of workplace sexual harassment generally, without
differentiating the gender of either the harasser or the victim, as this issue is not the focus of this Note. For a
discussion on same-sex harassment, see, for example, William C. Sung, Taking the Fight Back to Title VII: A Case for
Redefining “Because of Sex” to Include Gender Stereotypes, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity, 84 S. CAL. L. REV.
487 (2011).
43 See Higgins, supra note 9.
44 Id. at 155.
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employers’ efforts to minimize liability for sexual harassment possibly infringe upon the
First Amendment right to free speech. Part II provides a brief summary of each of these
issues, which will provide the basis for analyzing a putative claim involving BYOD devices,
discussed in Part III.
A.

The Location Issue
When sexual-harassment lawsuits began, employers only owed a duty to employees
within the “physical environment of the workplace.”45 Since then, liability has been
extended to include harassment that occurs outside of the physical workplace.46
Specifically, some out-of-office activities like “meetings, business trips, and employersponsored social events” can be considered under the “totality of the circumstances”
standard used to evaluate sexual-harassment claims because they are an “extension” of the
workplace.47
But new technological developments, like the Internet and devices that can
constantly access the Internet, have even further obliterated the boundaries of the
traditional workplace. These technological developments make it difficult to determine
“when an employee is on duty,” and they complicate the analysis of whether behavior that
occurs out of the office contributes to sexual harassment.48 Unfortunately, Title VII and its
legislative history do not address the boundaries of the workplace issue, leaving it to the
courts.49
However, the courts have not come to a clear determination on this issue. The
Supreme Court has not yet addressed the location issue and circuit courts have come down
differently on the issue of whether non-workplace behavior matters in lawsuits on sexual
harassment. The Fifth Circuit, for example, held that evidence of non-workplace conduct
can “help determine the severity and pervasiveness of hostility in the workplace.”50
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit held that harassment that occurs outside of work is
actionable, as long as there are “consequences in the workplace.” 51 In contrast, the Sixth
Circuit has said that an employer is “[generally] not liable for the harassment or other
unlawful conduct perpetrated by a non-supervisory employee after work hours and away
from the workplace setting.”52 But the Sixth Circuit has also said that it would be reasonable

45
46
47
48

Id. at 162.
Id.
Gelms, supra note 2, at 269.
Megan Shuba Glowacki, Comment, On the Job and Off: Why Evidence of a Hostile Work Environment Should Never
Clock Out, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 351, 360 (2009).
49 Douglas R. Garmager, Note, Discrimination Outside of the Office: Where to Draw the Walls of the Workplace for a
“Hostile Work Environment” Claim Under Title VII, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1075, 1077 (2010).
50 Glowacki, supra note 48, at 358.
51 Garmager, supra note 49, at 1076.
52 Glowacki, supra note 48, at 359 (citing Duggins v. Steak n’ Shake, Inc., 3 F. App’x 302, 311 (6th Cir. 2001)).
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for an employee to subjectively feel that a workplace is hostile if “forced to work for, or in
close proximity to, someone who is harassing her outside the workplace.”53
The EEOC likewise provides little guidance on how to handle these new
technological developments affecting the harassment in the workplace. In a page on its
website entitled “Prohibited Employment Policies/Practices,” the EEOC notes that
“[h]arassment outside of the workplace may also be illegal if there is a link with the
workplace.”54 But there is no corresponding regulation that explains what constitutes a
satisfactory “link”; nor is there clarifying information available on the website.55
Additionally, the example given is physical harassment (an employer driving an employee
to a meeting), so it is unclear from EEOC regulations if harassment occurring in the virtual
world is a strong enough link to the workplace to be illegal under Title VII. 56 This is
problematic for victims of electronic harassment because employers, if not legally liable,
are not incentivized to provide protections to employees or internal remedies, leaving
victims without either legal or workplace remedy against sexual harassment.
B.

Electronic Employee Monitoring Issues
Technology has not only impacted the ability of people to harass those they work
with but it has also enabled employers to monitor their employees’ electronic actions.
Employers monitor their employees for a variety of reasons: to protect trade secrets and
confidential information and to make sure that employees are not engaging in
inappropriate behavior, harassment included.57 Common ways to monitor employees
include “access panels, filters and firewalls, and [the] monitoring of social network and
search engine usage.”58 The majority of employers use at least some form of electronic
monitoring,59 and it is estimated that “more than three-quarters of major U.S. corporations
record and review employee communications and activities on the job, including telephone
calls, e-mail, internet communications, and computer files.”60
Monitoring employees relates to sexual harassment primarily for the implications it
has in an employer’s awareness of harassment. David Garrie notes that employers cannot
physically observe everything their employees do during a workday, but that employers can
“actively monitor” behavior online.61 Garrie argues that this ability to monitor employees
53 Id.
54 Prohibited Employment Policies/Practices, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.
c.gov/laws/practices (last visited Oct. 14, 2014).
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Comisky & Diamond, supra note 3, at 401.
58 Corey A. Ciocchetti, The Eavesdropping Employer: A Twenty-First Century Framework for Employee Monitoring, 48
AM. BUS. L.J. 285, 301–02 (2011).
59 Id. at 286.
60 Daniel B. Garrie, Limiting the Affirmative Defense in the Digital Workplace, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 229, 242 (2012).
61 Id. at 231.
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electronically should limit an employer’s ability to use the Ellerth and Faragher affirmative
defense.62 He says that the courts should take into consideration the “size and scope” of a
company’s “technological infrastructure” and the affirmative defense should only be
available if the company lacked the ability to monitor employees’ behavior.63 Garrie argues
that because employers have the ability to monitor their employees, those employers
should “bear the burden” to protect employees from sexual harassment.64
But monitoring comes with a high cost to employees: the lack of privacy. Employees
have no expectation of privacy if the employer owns the computer, if the employee accessed
information through the employer’s network, or if the employer specifically tells its
employees that there is no expectation of privacy (for example, tells them of monitoring
policies).65 The general principle is that “employees have no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the presence of an employer monitoring policy.”66 Indeed, the Supreme Court
has created a “perverse incentive”67 for stringent employee monitoring because, under the
standard in Ortega, workplace searches are limited by the “operational realities of the
workplace.”68 This means that actual practices may give employees an expectation of
privacy that employers cannot then intrude upon. 69 It is therefore in employers’ best
interests to constantly monitor, with employees’ knowledge, so as to enable further future
monitoring. While this is helpful in preventing sexual harassment, or rectifying it once it
has been discovered, it does come at a high cost to employee privacy.
Employees are not without protection from invasions into their privacy, but those
protections are piecemeal. There is no “comprehensive statutory scheme” that protects
employees’ privacy or governs electronic monitoring.70 At the federal level, there are two
acts that may apply. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) “makes it a criminal
offense to gain unauthorized access to an individual’s computer and permits the recovery
of civil damages when the unauthorized access results in damage exceeding $5,000.”71 The
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) has two titles that are also relevant
to electronic monitoring.72 First, the Wiretap Act “regulates intentional interception, use,

62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

Id.at 248–49.
Id. at 232.
Id. at 247.
Amanda J. Lavis, Note, Employers Cannot Get the Message: Text Messaging and Employee Privacy, 54 VILL. L. REV. 513,
534 (2009).
Id. at 533.
Justin Conforti, Comment, Somebody’s Watching Me: Workplace Privacy Interests, Technology Surveillance, and the
Ninth Circuit’s Misapplication of the Ortega Test in Quon v. Arch Wireless, 5 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 461, 486 (2009).
Marissa A. Lalli, Note, Spicy Little Conversations: Technology in the Workplace and a Call for a New Cross-Doctrinal
Jurisprudence, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 243 (2011) (citing O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987)).
See id. at 245.
Garrie, supra note 60, at 245 n.94.
Comisky & Diamond, supra note 3, at 401.
Ciocchetti, supra note 58, at 292.
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or disclosure of wire, oral, and electronic communications.”73 Second, the Stored
Communications Act (SCA) “governs electronic communications already transmitted and
currently in storage.”74 However, scholars have argued that the ECPA is “essentially
meaningless in today’s workplace environment” because “technology has advanced to the
point where almost no transmissions are covered by the statute.”75 At the state level, there
are also some laws that provide protection.76
C.

The First Amendment Issue
Related to the privacy issues raised by electronically monitoring employees, sexualharassment litigation also raises First Amendment issues regarding the restriction of the
right of free speech. Employees may feel or believe their private e-mails or text messages
should be protected under the First Amendment.77 Some have argued that employers will
“suppress protected expression” to prevent Title VII liability, which will have a “chilling
effect” on free speech.78
But the First Amendment provides only “limited protection against speech
restrictions” in the workplace.79 First Amendment protection extends only to public
employees,80 and even those employees are only protected if they speak on matters of
public concern, subject to a balancing test.81 Currently, private employers can also restrict
off-duty speech, if they can “prove a legitimate business interest in regulating their
employee’s off-duty conduct.”82 In addition, scholars have noted that sexual harassment is
an act, not speech, and as such, deserves no protection under the First Amendment. 83 As
long as “‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct,”
it appears that there is no First Amendment problem with employers restricting employees’

73
74
75
76

77
78
79
80
81
82
83

Id.
Id. at 293.
Id. at 293–94.
Comisky & Diamond, supra note 3, at 401. See also Garrie, supra note 60, at 245 n.94 (citing Ariana R. Levinson,
Industrial Justice: Privacy Protection for the Employed, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 609, 620–21 (2009)). Examples
include laws restricting employers from asking prospective and current employees for password-protected
information on personal social media accounts or laws requiring employers to give notice or obtain permission for
monitoring. In Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650 (N.J. 2010), the New Jersey Supreme Court held an
employer liable when it inappropriately accessed information from employee e-mail. So these state laws do provide
some employee protection.
Higgins, supra note 9, at 167.
Burke, supra note 19, at 612–13.
Patricia Sánchez Abril, Avner Levin, & Alissa Del Riego, Blurred Boundaries: Social Media Privacy and the TwentyFirst-Century Employee, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 63, 90 (2012).
Amy Horton, Comment, Of Supervision, Centerfolds, and Censorship: Sexual Harassment, the First Amendment, and
the Contours of Title VII, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 403, 419 (1991).
Abril et al., supra note 79, at 91.
Id. at 94–95 (discussing how the lack of statutes governing the intersection between social media and work means
that U.S. employers can legally fire employees for information posted on social media sites, even while off-duty).
See David K. McGraw, Sexual Harassment in Cyberspace: The Problem of Unwanted E-mail, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. L.J. 491 (1995).
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ability to say what they want, whether or not it occurs during work.84 Therefore, this is
generally an issue that may seem like a bigger challenge than it legally would be.
III.

BRING YOUR OWN DEVICE POLICIES

A.

The Basics of a BYOD Policy
“Bring Your Own Device” (BYOD) policies allow employees to use their own
personal devices for work.85 These policies do two things: they decrease technology costs
to employers and keep employees happy.86 These benefits have employers rapidly
switching to BYOD programs. Up to “fifty-three percent of employees are using their own
technology for work purposes,”87 while “thirty-eight percent of chief information officers
told Gartner [a technology research and advisory firm] that their organizations will stop
providing company-issued laptops, smartphones, and tablets to workers by 2016.”88
The proliferation of this policy has led some practitioners to publish articles that
both highlight some potential legal problems that may occur under this type of policy and
give some general advice on implementing such a policy.89 But there has yet to be a full
academic discussion of the impact BYOD policies will have on the landscape of sexualharassment cases, which is the gap that this Note begins to address. The few academic
articles that discuss BYOD policies have focused primarily on the policies connection to
electronic monitoring, as well as how to draft a successful BYOD policy that would make
sure employees are aware of the conditions of participating in the program.90 Some of these
articles recommend that employers inform employees that use of personal devices must
comply with harassment policies,91 but not all of them do.92
The only academic article that does briefly mention harassment in relation to BYOD
devices assumes that there would be employer liability for harassment that occurs while

84 Burke, supra note 19 (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)). See this source for a more detailed
explanation of the First Amendment complexities in sexual-harassment cases.
85 See Dave Zielinski, Bring Your Own Device, HRMAGAZINE, Feb 2012, http://www.questia.com/magazine/1P32581316401/bring-your-own-device.
86 Comisky & Diamond, supra note 3, at 386.
87 Id.
88 Yaron Dori & Jeff Kosseff, Employers Must Obtain Employee Consent for BYOD Programs, LAW360 (May 24, 2013, 11:12
AM EST), http://www.law360.com/articles/444702/employers-must-obtain-employee-consent-for-byod-programs.
89 See, e.g., John Chapas, Don’t Ignore the Risks of BYOD Programs, LAW360 (Feb. 20, 2013, 12:06 PM EST),
http://www.law360.com/articles/409944/don-t-ignore-the-risks-of-byod-programs; Philip Gordon, 5 Lessons for
Employers From California v. Riley, LITTLER MENDELSON (July 10, 2014), https://www.littler.com/five-lessonsemployers-california-v-riley; Damian LaPlaca, The Legal Challenges of ‘Bring Your Own Device’, LAW360 (Jan. 8, 2013,
12:06 PM EST), http://www.law360.com/articles/402551/the-legal-challenges-of-bring-your-own-device; Dori &
Kosseff, supra note 88.
90 See Comisky & Diamond, supra note 3.
91 See, e.g., id. at 391 (“Employers must ensure that their existing policies extend to inappropriate communications on
employee-owned devices and properly train employees on acceptable standards of conduct.”).
92 See, e.g., Chapas, supra note 89; LaPlaca, supra note 89 (focusing on security and employee privacy).
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using a BYOD device.93 This assumption is made without exploring the unique aspects of
digital sexual harassment and BYOD devices and so does not explore whether the law is
suited for a BYOD claim.
To understand likely outcomes of sexual-harassment cases involving BYOD devices,
this Note will first look at some cases involving digital workplace sexual harassment. “Few
cases have addressed employer liability” for “digital workplace sexual harassment.”94 Those
cases did not involve BYOD devices. One case held that rampant, “unchecked” offensive emails going around a workplace could be sexual harassment, but a single instance of an
offensive e-mail was not enough to constitute a claim.95 In another, e-mails from
supervisors, in combination with non-digital comments, were considered relevant in
considering a claim of sexual harassment.96 Finally, the New Jersey Supreme Court
recognized a claim of sexual harassment for material posted on an electronic bulletin
board.97
The first case involving BYOD devices and sexual harassment will look very different
from the facts of these three cases because of the issues discussed in Part II. Each issue will
be discussed below.
B.

The Legal Challenges of a BYOD Policy Under Traditional Sexual Harassment Law

1.
The Location Problem
First, BYOD devices are paid for by the employee and double as that employee’s
work and personal device.98 Consider an employee who works forty hours a week and has
a BYOD smartphone that she takes with her everywhere. Even if that employee sleeps eight
hours a night, that still leaves seventy hours—a majority of the week—when the employee
is carrying and using that phone as a personal device, off-site. This creates a situation where
harassment of a co-worker or a supervisee could occur almost entirely from home, on a
personal device. This stands in contrast to the cases where e-mails have come from
employees on work computers, at work.99
Given the circuit split on the issue of employer liability for off-site harassment,
consider the following situation: harassing texts or e-mails are sent from one employee’s
BYOD smartphone to another, only during non-work hours, from non-work places, and
93 Comisky & Diamond, supra note 3, at 387 (“One of the risks associated with BYOD is that employees will use their
own devices to communicate in an inappropriate manner, leading to employer liability.”).
94 Garrie, supra note 60, at 238.
95 Id. (discussing Owens v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 96 CIV. 9747, 1997 WL 403454, at 2 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 1997)).
96 Id. at 238–39 (discussing Strauss v. Microsoft Corp., 91 CIV. 5928, 1995 WL 326492, at 4–5 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 1995)).
97 Id. at 239 (discussing Blakey v. Cont’l Airlines, 751 A.2d 538 (N.J. 2000)).
98 See Comisky & Diamond, supra note 3, at 387.
99 See, e.g., Owens v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 96 CIV. 9747, 1997 WL 403454, at 2 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 1997) (describing
one e-mail that was sent while at work); Strauss v. Microsoft Corp., 91 CIV. 5928, 1995 WL 326492, at 4–5 (S.D.N.Y.
June 1, 1995) (describing the e-mails from a supervisor to employees in the office).
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there are no other harassing activities taking place at the actual workplace. Is this conduct
for which an employer is liable? Under the Fifth Circuit’s test, a claim like this is unlikely
to succeed because there is no hostility that is occurring in the workplace.100 The Seventh
Circuit would likely consider these actions to be harassment but would still require the
plaintiff to prove that there are consequences in the workplace.101 So if a plaintiff cannot
show any type of harassment or repercussions at work, the claim may be barred. Finally,
the Sixth Circuit may only find that there is employer liability if the harasser and the
harassed have to work “in proximity” together.102 In Duggins v. Steak N’ Shake, Inc., the
Sixth Circuit found that even though both the plaintiff and her alleged rapist were
employees of Steak N’ Shake, because they never worked at the same restaurant and he
never managed her, it was not a hostile work environment.103 Under this test, if the
harassment occurs between two individuals who do not see each other at work (for
example, they work in two different offices in the same city), this claim may be barred as
well.
If this claim is not successful, then the employee is unprotected in this situation,
and yet, it is clear that the employee is suffering from some type of sexual harassment.
Because the location matters so much, traditional sexual-harassment law does not clearly
protect those who are victimized far from work, even though the work relationship is
central to the harassment.
ii.
The Employer Notice Problem
Another potential difference for cases involving sexual harassment and BYOD
devices is the limitations employers may have on electronic monitoring of those dualpurpose devices. Employers are still able to monitor BYOD devices because they can require
employee consent to monitoring as a prerequisite for participation in the program.104
However, employees tend to be leery of their employer’s ability to monitor them. A 2012
Harris Poll found that 82 percent of employees think it is an invasion of privacy if the
employer can track them, for example, through a smartphone’s GPS capabilities; 76 percent
100 See Part II-A; see also Glowacki, supra note 48, at 356–58 (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s test as requiring harassment
to affect the work environment, but not considering behavior that occurred outside the workplace in Gowesky v.
Singing River Hosp. Sys., 321 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2003)).
101 See supra Part II; see also Garmager, supra note 49, at 1076.
102 Glowacki, supra note 48, at 360 (citing Duggins v. Steak n’ Shake, Inc., 3 F. App’x 302, 311 (6th Cir. 2001)).
103 3 F. App’x 302, 311 (6th Cir. 2001). The alleged rape took place at a non-work event off-site.
104 See, e.g., Comisky & Diamond, supra note 3, at 408. An interesting question is whether an employer could escape
liability by contracting only for certain applications, programs, or capabilities on a BYOD device, thus considering
all other programs “personal” and not having to monitor them. For example, if a company only allows email on
personal smartphones, but expressly does not allow workplace texting on the phone, then could they be liable for
harassment via text? Given that companies often monitor for multiple reasons, primarily to make sure no sensitive
information (like trade secrets) are being shared, it seems unlikely that companies would limit their own ability to
monitor employees in an attempt to avoid liability, however, this is a question that warrants further exploration, but
is beyond the scope of this paper.
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of employees would not allow their employer to access applications they have installed on
a personal device; and 82 percent of employees are concerned about employers tracking
their internet usage while not at work.105
There are some current legal restrictions to what an employer can access on the
BYOD device as well. For example, employers have been held liable for “inappropriately
accessing and using information obtained from employee social media and electronic
communication accounts.”106 And there are some limited protections for employee privacy
in the form of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986;107 however, as discussed in Part II, these boundaries are murky and may
not apply to the technology BYOD devices use.
Ultimately, what an employer can monitor on BYOD devices will come down to the
legal limitations, but that is not to say that employee concerns over privacy will not factor
into what the company policy allows. The results of the Harris Poll show that employers
having too much access on personal devices is a serious concern of employees.108 Given this
concern, employers may face difficulty with policies that are too broad and allow for too
much access, and so they may be limited by their own policies as well.
Either way, employers will not have unfettered access to personal devices. This
limited access may provide employers with immunity from sexual-harassment suits
because they may lack notice of the sexual harassment. An employer cannot escape liability
for harassment if the employer knew about it and failed to take corrective and preventative
measures.109 With electronic monitoring, employers with the technological capacity could
constantly be checking for electronic harassment by flagging emails or other
correspondence that include problematic words; some scholars have argued that having
the capability to monitor employees and not doing so should prevent the employer from
using the Ellerth and Fargher affirmative defense at all.110 Thus, with electronic monitoring,
employers potentially have a greater chance of being on notice of this behavior; the
difference between liability and no liability, then, is whether or not the company acts to
rectify the situation. But if employers cannot monitor all of what is happening on a BYOD
device, then they may be less likely to be on notice of problematic behavior, making it
slightly easier for companies to avoid liability due to the limitations of electronic
monitoring on BYOD devices.

105 Harris Survey Exposes Concerns About Employee Privacy for BYOD, PR NEWSWIRE (Sept. 27, 2012),
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/harris-survey-exposes-concerns-about-employee-privacy-for-byod171520251.html.
106 Comisky & Diamond, supra note 3, at 403.
107 See supra Part II-B for a discussion on these two acts.
108 Harris Survey Exposes Concerns About Employee Privacy for BYOD, supra note 105.
109 Burke, supra note 19, at 599.
110 Garrie, supra note 60.
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It should be noted that, when faced with the issue, courts have not imposed a duty
on employers to monitor employees electronically. But courts will still hold employers
liable for harassment. For example, in Blakey, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that an
employer was liable for messages posted on an electronic bulletin board.111 Part of the
decision in Blakey was that the forum was so closely intertwined with the workplace that it
was an extension of the workplace.112 The other part of the decision rested on whether an
employer has notice of the harassment.113 Still, the court “explicitly stated” that an employer
has no duty to monitor employee e-mail.114
iii.
The (Lack of a) First Amendment Problem
As discussed in Part II, the First Amendment protections to what employees say is
actually quite limited, and as such, has a smaller role to play in the analysis of a BYOD
policy than many employees may believe. If a private employer can prove that they have a
legitimate business interest in curtailing an employee’s off-the-clock speech, then they can
limit it.115 This means that if an employer became aware of inappropriate or harassing
speech made on a BYOD device, it would be able to take action, given its interest in
complying with Title VII.
IV.

POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS FOR THE PROBLEMS CREATED IN APPLYING TRADITIONAL
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW TO CLAIMS INVOLVING BYOD DEVICES
As sexual harassment suits have stretched Title VII’s protection against sex
discrimination to its limit (and perhaps beyond),116 that stretching only continues with the
introduction of BYOD policies, which highlight how the state of the law focuses on location
and notice, potentially leaving victims without recourse. The uniqueness of these policies
requires an exploration of possible alternatives, which include both finding ways to change
the law so as to clearly hold the employer liable, or removing the location (and employer
liability) from the equation completely, and focusing on other forms of remedy for victims.
A.

Substantial Benefits Test
One solution that has been offered to deal with the proliferation of employee social
media use is a “substantial benefits” test.117 This test is a modification of the current sexual111 Blakey v. Con’t Airlines, 751 A.2d 538, 542–43 (N.J. 2000).
112 Id. at 551–52 (the test for determining if something is “sufficiently integrated” is whether the company received an
economic benefit from the site).
113 Id. at 543.
114 Higgins, supra note 9, at 168.
115 Abril et al., supra note 79, 94–95 (discussing how the lack of statutes governing the intersection between social media
and work means that U.S. employers can legally fire employees for information posted on social media sites, even
while off-duty).
116 See Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1250.
117 Gelms, supra note 2, at 251.
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harassment law. Jeremy Gelms argued that if an employer obtains a substantial benefit from
the social media that the employee used, then harassment that occurs on that medium
should be considered as part of the totality of the circumstances under traditional sexualharassment law.118 Gelms relied on the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Blakey to
articulate when an employer is deemed to receive a substantial benefit.119 The test depends
on whether “the social media was sufficiently integrated into the employer’s business
operations,” including whether or not employees could access company information on
social media, whether employees are communicating about company business or working
on a work-related project, and how many employees were using the social media forum.120
Using this modified, traditional sexual-harassment law, a court could examine whether the
employer received a substantial benefit from the device. If so, then any harassment that
occurred through the device could be considered in the totality of the circumstances and
factored into the hostile-workplace claim.
Social media and BYOD devices are similar in several ways: both can be accessed
from work or home, both usually contain very personal information, and both can also be
used as a business tool.121 A substantial benefits test, modifying the current sexualharassment law, solves both the location and ownership problems identified with BYOD
devices because it does not matter where, when, or how the harassing content was posted.
Use of this test would also solve the circuit split on including off-the-clock harassment in
the totality of the circumstances test for a hostile environment because it would
standardize when the court considers activity on a BYOD device during a sexualharassment suit.
Even though this approach would provide a clear remedy for victims, it does have
some major drawbacks. First, it is probable that courts would always find that employers
got substantial benefits from a BYOD device, because one of the main reasons behind
implementing this policy is an economic benefit to employers.122 Second, these benefits
would likely incentivize employers to heavily monitor all of the activity on a BYOD device.
Intrusive monitoring on a dual-purpose device may cause some employees to refuse to use
a BYOD device or give rise to claims that the monitoring restricts First Amendment
speech.123 Additionally, smaller employers may not be capable, financially or
technologically, of monitoring their employees’ phones. These drawbacks make this
solution unlikely to succeed.

118
119
120
121
122
123

Id.
Id. at 273.
Id.
Id. at 264–67.
Comisky & Diamond, supra note 3, at 386.
See supra text accompanying notes 115–16 (discussing the fact that First Amendment claims are likely to be
unsuccessful).
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B.

Employers are Not Liable
One forceful critique of current sexual-harassment law is that it only recognizes
sexual harassment that “occurs in certain protected settings,”124 one of which is the
employment setting. But the problems discussed in this paper demonstrate that the
expansion of electronic communications has resulted in harassment that is not limited to
one protected setting. Nor are the repercussions limited to the workplace. 125 It begs the
question, is focusing on employer liability the best way to analyze sexual-harassment
claims? This section explores a few alternatives to protecting individuals who are sexually
harassed without going through Title VII. This Note argues that the proliferation of
technology has changed how work is done, and so tying sexual-harassment law to a certain
physical location leaves victims of sexual harassment exposed and without remedy. The
following potential solutions recognize that location is less important and change how
victims could fight back against harassment.
i.
Civil Tort Remedies
There is a distinction between the harm caused by harassment and the context of
the harassment.126 Because sexual-harassment law is focused on Title VII as the solution to
workplace sexual harassment, some have argued that it places too much emphasis on the
context of the sexual harassment rather than the dignitary harm the harassment causes. 127
For example, rather than providing a solution to anyone who is a victim of sexual
harassment, solutions are only available to those who are victimized within a certain
context: work. One solution is to step back from Title VII litigation for sexual harassment
and instead use common-law tort actions.128
Under the common-law tort approach, claims that “can be said to injure an
individual’s dignitary interests” are actionable.129 While there are several torts that could
potentially be relied upon in pursuing a tort claim against a harasser—like battery, assault,
invasion of privacy, or intentional infliction of emotional distress—all of the actions
recognize the inherent human dignity in the harassed individual. 130 This is appealing
because it recognizes that the dignitary interests of the harassed individual are not simply
affected while at work—for example, if employees receive messages on the weekends sent
through BYOD devices.

124 Mary Anne Franks, Sexual Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. 655, 657 (2012).
125 See Kathryn Abrams, The Constitution of Women, 48 ALA. L. REV. 861, 879 (1997) (discussing how sexualizing women
can “poison relations in the workplace as well in more intimate contexts”).
126 See Ehrenreich, supra note 35, at 3.
127 Id. at 4.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 22.
130 Id. at 22–23.
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Monetarily, it may be appealing to plaintiffs as well, as there are caps on what some
federal employees can get from employers under Title VII. 131 Additionally, in 1976, the
Supreme Court held that Title VII was “an exclusive, preemptive administrative and judicial
scheme for the redress of federal employment discrimination.”132 This has led to a circuit
split on whether Title VII preempts torts that arise out of the same set of facts as the Title
VII suit.133 If civil torts, as opposed to Title VII, were adopted as the method for dealing with
sexual harassment, then federal employees in particular would be relieved of the financial
limits involved in Title VII litigation, which may make it a more attractive option for
plaintiffs.
Using common-law torts as the primary method of dealing with sexual harassment
has several benefits, the most important being the untying of harassment to a location,
since modern technology allows for harassment to occur anywhere and anytime. First, as
discussed above, it would be better for federal employees who are victims of sexual
harassment. Second, this approach recognizes that sexual harassment can cause harm to
an individual’s dignity without requiring a hostile workplace, while solving the location
problem caused by BYOD devices. Additionally, under civil torts, the plaintiffs may sue the
perpetrator of the harassment rather than the employer. An employer would likely still
monitor BYOD devices for business-related information, like exposure of trade secrets, but
the company would be less concerned about monitoring purely personal e-mails or texts,
giving individuals more privacy. This could solve the concerns about overly-intrusive
electronic monitoring and its accompanying privacy concerns. And if the company is less
concerned about what people say, there is little chance of employees making a First
Amendment chilling-speech argument.
But plaintiffs would likely still find it financially attractive to sue employers under
the tort doctrine of respondeat superior, if the plaintiff can prove the harasser was acting
within the scope of employment.134 This means that employers are still going to be
incentivized to monitor employees, and so the problems of monitoring and free speech
may not be solved after all. Still, what the plaintiff would have to prove for a tort would
revolve less around the context of the harassment (whether there was an impact on the
work environment) and focus more on the harm that matters to the plaintiff—the dignitary
harm.

131 Robert M. Mahoney, Note, Don’t Discriminate Against Distinct or Highly Personal Harms: An Analysis of Section 717
of Title VII Pertaining to Preemption of Alternative Theories of Recovery by Federal Employees, 19 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL &
APP. ADVOC. 310, 329 (2014) (discussing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, administrative requirements, statute of
limitations, and other caps on recovery).
132 Brown v. Gen. Serv. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 828–29 (1976).
133 See Mahoney, supra note 131, at 316–17 (discussing specific court decisions).
134 See Respondeat Superior, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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ii.
Stalking Laws
In contrast to the civil-tort remedy, stalking laws may provide an alternative
criminal recourse for victims of sexual harassment. For those who are victimized by BYOD
device users outside of the workplace, this may be a very beneficial tool, because it focuses
on the harassment rather than the impact on the workplace.135 This would be a very limited
solution because stalking laws focus on a very specific type of harassment and definitions
of stalking vary from state to state,136 though there is also a federal statute that prohibits
stalking under the Interstate Commerce Clause.137 Stalking laws would likely not
encompass behavior that, under traditional sexual-harassment law, has been shown to
create a hostile work environment, such as repeated passing comments that disparage
women in general.138 However, these statutes usually include engaging in “harassing or
threatening behavior . . . such as following a person, appearing at a person’s home or place
of business, making harassing phone calls, leaving written messages or objects, or
vandalizing a person’s property.”139 So it may be a solution if the harassment is “sufficiently
repetitive, obsessive, and frightening.”140 It is possible to envision, then, a type of sexual
harassment that occurs at work and involves repeated, specific threats that may qualify
under stalking laws.
Taking responsibility off of the employer and putting it onto the harasser/stalker
eliminates the employer monitoring issues discussed earlier and the location issue of the
BYOD device. But relying on stalking laws has serious downsides for the average employee
who is harassed at work. These statutes may only be effective for the most serious cases of
sexual harassment. Additionally, stalking tends to conjure up the image of a stalker being
in a place they should not be. In an employment context, if both the harassed and the
harasser were employed at the same company, the harasser would have every right to be in
the same building as the harassed person; it may be difficult to prove claims of stalking,
meaning that some claims of harassment may go without repercussions. This would not be
a problem, though, if a state defines contact to include electronic contact. Still, relying
solely on stalking laws, as an alternative to Title VII, is dangerous and leaves too many
victims without protection.

135 See Robert E. Rodes, Jr., On Law and Chastity, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 643, 702 (2001).
136 Rebecca K. Lee, Essay: Romantic and Electronic Stalking in a College Context, 4 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 373, 379
(1998).
137 18 U.S.C. § 2261(b)(6) (2012).
138 Rodes, supra note 135, at 702 (“ordinary sexual harassment is not” the problem anti-stalking laws were designed to
prevent).
139 Lee, supra note 136, at 379 (citing KENNETH R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 92-735 A, ANTI-STALKING STATUTES:
BACKGROUND AND CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 2 (1992)).
140 Rodes, supra note 135, at 702.
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C.

Specific Federal Statutes and Federal Agencies That Can Address Sexual Harassment
The last alternative to traditional sexual-harassment law that this Note will address
is the creation of specific federal statutes to address each tension in traditional sexualharassment law illustrated when applying it to BYOD devices. This would be a modification
of traditional sexual-harassment law and is the best alternative to existing law.
There are two types of statutes that Congress could enact to address the issues of
traditional sexual-harassment law that arise when applied to BYOD devices. First, Congress
could enact a statute that addresses the location issue. Courts have struggled with
pinpointing when an employer should be liable for off-location harassment since the
location of the harassment is not addressed in Title VII.141 A statute that defined the
location for the sex discrimination, however Congress chose to set those boundaries, would
clarify whether employers are liable for harassment that occurs on BYOD devices outside
of the workplace. Having clear boundaries is important for establishing clear remedies. If
an employer is clear about its legal liability, it is more likely to provide more effective
internal solutions in addition to a victim’s legal rights.
Second, Congress could also create statutes that establish the limits of employer
electronic monitoring; currently there is no federal comprehensive scheme on this issue.142
As discussed in Part II, the only applicable statutes that address this issue are the CFAA
and the ECPA, but scholars have noted that these provisions do not realistically cover the
technological transmissions that employees may be using to sexually harass other
employees.143 Establishing the limits of this type of monitoring also would establish the
limits on the particular sexually harassing behavior on BYOD devices that can reasonably
be expected to give employers notice. This would simultaneously eliminate any First
Amendment chilling-speech claims, because the employee would be expected to know
what programs and types of communications on the BYOD device are protected from
monitoring. Again, the current legal standard is that an employer must only establish a
legitimate business interest to curtail employee speech on the parts of the device that are
being monitored.144
A related, but different, solution is for Congress to create federal statutes that would
move away from the traditional sexual-harassment law rather than modifying it. One such
possibility is moving liability for this type of harassment away from the work world and
towards the virtual world. Congress could enact statutes that hold Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) liable for content that creates a hostile environment online. ISPs have been
defined as entities that host websites and entities that host message boards, auction sites,

141
142
143
144

See Garmager, supra note 49, at 1077.
Garrie, supra note 60, at 245 n.94.
Ciocchetti, supra note 58, at 293–94.
Abril et al., supra note 79, at 95.
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e-mail listservs, and Internet dating sites.145 This approach has been advocated by at least
one author searching for a legal recourse when teenagers use the Internet to bully each
other.146 However, under current law, this approach is not a possibility because of § 230 of
the Communications Decency Act (CDA), which has been interpreted to give ISPs
immunity from those claims.147 The § 230 defense is that ISPs are not liable for content
from third parties.148 If Congress abrogated this defense, then ISPs could replace employers
as the party liable for sexual harassment that occurs through harassing emails or posts on
social media. There are some recent court decisions that indicate that courts “may be ready
to rethink” the blanket immunity of § 230,149 and perhaps it is time that Congress does so
too. However, this would create great administrative problems: how is a company like
Comcast supposed to monitor each of its users and quickly flag harassing activity? Because
of the enormity of the administrative challenges, this solution is not likely to be successful.
With respect to federal agencies, a final solution is to have the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) each
regulate the Internet and other online communication issues;150 this would also take the
liability out of the hands of the employers. The FCC was established in 1934 and regulates
“interstate and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and
cable.”151 The FTC has a charter to “protect consumers and police anticompetitive
practices.”152 Scholars have argued that the FTC and the FCC should “jointly develop general
privacy principles” for users of communication technologies.153 The flip side of the legal
ability for these Commissions to create privacy rules is the power to create rules that would
establish liability when the technologies are abused and used to sexually harass individuals.
Because new technologies and electronic communications are increasingly
interconnected and increasingly ubiquitous, liability for the abuse of these technologies
could be considered a step removed from a specific context (for example, the workplace)
or a specific technology (for example, an e-mail). However, the same administrative issues
145 Walter Stillwell, Note, Carafano v. Metrosplash.com: An Expansion of Tort Immunity for Web Service Providers Under
47 U.S.C. 230, Even When They Take a Greater Editorial Role in Publishing Material from Third Parties, 6 TUL. J. TECH.
& INTELL. PROP. 307, 311–12 (2004).
146 KrisAnn Norby-Jahner, Comment, “Minor” Online Sexual Harassment and the CDA § 230 Defense: New Directions for
Internet Service Provider Liability, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 207, 209 (2009). Teenagers who are bullied online generally
have only common-law theories as legal recourse. In contrast, workers and students have Title VII and Title IX,
respectively, as a legal recourse.
147 Id. at 210.
148 Id. at 233.
149 Id. at 239–40 (discussing these cases and their implications).
150 John Soma, Melodi Mosley Gates & Michael Smith, Bit-Wise But Privacy Foolish: Smarter E-Messaging Technologies
Call for a Return to Core Privacy Principles, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 487, 491 (2010); see also Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy
and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1679–80 (1999).
151 Soma et al., supra note 150, at 518 (citing FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM’N, About the FCC,
http://www.fcc.gov/aboutus.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2015)).
152 Id.
153 Soma et al., supra note 150, at 530.
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that exist in creating ISP liability exist in having these federal agencies oversee harassment
and so is also unlikely to succeed.
CONCLUSION
BYOD policies and devices test the strength of workplace sexual-harassment law
because they exist at the tensions between location and ownership, privacy, and First
Amendment concerns. As there has yet to be an explicit case concerning BYOD devices,
policies, and sexual harassment to reach the courts, it is unclear how the courts will address
those claims and whether any of those issues will be so problematic as to prevent employers
from being liable under Title VII, thus leaving sexual-harassment victims without legal
remedies for their harassment.
Although there are numerous problems with the current state of the law, the offered
solutions to these problems are not without their own challenges, either in adoption or in
practice. For example, if traditional sexual-harassment law is modified by the substantial
benefits test, courts will likely always find that an employer gets substantial benefits from
a BYOD device, meaning it is unlikely to be adopted because it would make employers de
facto liable for any sexual harassment that occurs on the device. On the other hand, relying
on civil-tort remedies, rather than traditional sexual-harassment law, may end up just
being a different way to reach employer liability, which means employee monitoring would
remain an issue. Similarly, relying solely on stalking laws might leave some victims without
remedy (if the behavior does not meet the elements of the stalking statute), and the
employer would not be liable. Using federal agencies or transferring liability to the Internet
provider provides incredibly complex administrative problems, and so is also unlikely to be
a successful solution to the problem.
The most straightforward solution, it seems, is for Congress to recognize that there
are limits to the current Title VII protections that may leave some victims without a remedy
and to enact specific statutes that address those limitations. If Congress addresses the issue,
then courts can have clear lines on employer liability under Title VII and can address BYOD
devices within those lines. Additionally, keeping liability through Title VII (as opposed to
relying on civil torts, or creating liability for ISPs) has the benefit of keeping the long history
of legislation and jurisprudence relating to Title VII relevant rather than attempting to start
from a clean slate. Finally, Congress-enacted statutes may be the best approach to reconcile
the impact sexual harassment has both on the employee and on the employer. Employers
are economically disadvantaged when the work environment is hostile.154 By keeping
responsibility on employers, while defining limits of this liability, employers can work
within well-defined legal bounds regarding location, employee privacy, and First
154 See Krista J. Schoenheider, A Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1461,
1464–65 (1986); McGraw, supra note 83, at 502.
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Amendment issues to run an efficient workplace that minimizes the harms of sexual
harassment.
With the increasing integration of technology into our lives, we need to make sure
we are updating our protections so that the vulnerable are not left without protection.
Asking Congress to create specific federal statutes addressing the weakness in Title VII
legislation is the best solution to ensure remedies are available to victims of workplace
sexual harassment, regardless of where, when, or how harassing messages are
communicated.
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